

## RELIABILITY ANALYSIS OF BUTTERFLY VALVE (BV) USING THE FAILURE AND EVENTS TREES

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**Abstract:** In this paper, the predictive reliability study it has been made analyzing the failure modes of elements, starting from undesirable events. The events tree of BV it has been represented in view of the undesirable hypothesis (events), like: the failure of a function ( $f_i$ ); the failure of a BV subsystem.

### 1. Introduction

In this second paper it has been continued the studies of BV predictive reliability using the failure and events trees.

During the reliability analysis, the butterfly valve (BV) from HPP Remeți, it has been regarded like a system compound of following subsystems:

- The closing subsystem (CSS);
- The sealing subsystem (SSS);
- The control subsystem (NSS);
- The operate subsystem (OSS);
- The protection subsystem (PSS).

### 2. The reliability analysis of BV using the failure and events trees

For a profound understanding of the BV elements failure modes, in succession it is presented a case study for BV 360-170 from HPP Remeti (table 1).

**Table 1** Failures modes of BV elements

Subsystem	Elements	Failures modes	Symbol
0	1	2	3
CSS	the carcass	• flaws or holes (pore appearance)	F <sub>1</sub>
		• solid bodies accumulations	F <sub>2</sub>
		• fixed joining surface of two semi carcass wear (upstream and downstream)	F <sub>3</sub>
		• wear of assembling elements (screws)	F <sub>4</sub>
	the shutter disk	• wear	F <sub>5</sub>
		• deviation (changing the functioning parameters)	F <sub>6</sub>
		• cavitation	F <sub>7</sub>
		• shutting of	F <sub>8</sub>
	the spindles	• greased absence	F <sub>9</sub>
		• wear	F <sub>10</sub>
		• screws deterioration	F <sub>11</sub>
		• wear of sealing elements (rubber seals, quad rings)	F <sub>12</sub>
		• searing sleeve	F <sub>13</sub>
		• change of dimension, flare and ovality	F <sub>14</sub>

	the arms	• shutting of pin tearing	F <sub>15</sub>
		• shutting of	F <sub>16</sub>
SSS	the sealing seat	• wear	F <sub>17</sub>
		• the pshycal-chemical properties changing	F <sub>18</sub>
	the sealing elements	• the pshycal-chemical properties changing	F <sub>19</sub>
		• wear	F <sub>20</sub>
		• wear of control elements	F <sub>21</sub>
the rubber seal	• seal breakage	F <sub>22</sub>	
	• stressing up to specified limits	F <sub>23</sub>	
NSS	manual	• functioning parameters changing	F <sub>24</sub>
		• interruption	F <sub>26</sub>
	automatic	• functioning parameters changing	F <sub>27</sub>
		• interruption	F <sub>28</sub>
	the protections	• interruption	F <sub>29</sub>
		• unidentified	F <sub>30</sub>
OSS	the needle valve	• needle blocking	F <sub>31</sub>
		• sticking the sealing surfaces	F <sub>32</sub>
		• wear of assembling and fastening elements (screws, pins)	F <sub>33</sub>
		• the rod thread deterioration	F <sub>34</sub>
		• servomotor functioning parameters modification	F <sub>35</sub>
	the servomotor	• wear of piston	F <sub>36</sub>
		• the rod thread deterioration	F <sub>37</sub>
		• wear of sealing elements (seals, rings)	F <sub>38</sub>
		• wear of assembling and fastening elements (screws, pins)	F <sub>39</sub>
		• wear of rod head bushing	F <sub>40</sub>
	the control valve with electromagnet	• wear of servomotor pin	F <sub>41</sub>
		• wear of slide -valve	F <sub>42</sub>
		• the tilting screw deterioration	F <sub>43</sub>
		• the rod thread deterioration	F <sub>44</sub>
		• wear of sealing elements (seals)	F <sub>45</sub>
		• wear of assembling and fastening elements (screws, pins)	F <sub>46</sub>
		• the electromagnet spring distortion	F <sub>47</sub>
		• the electromagnet coil tension absence	F <sub>48</sub>
	the constriction valve with double direction	• the insulation parameters modification	F <sub>49</sub>
		• unadjustement motion	F <sub>50</sub>
		• wear of sealing elements (seals)	F <sub>51</sub>
		• wear of valve seating	F <sub>52</sub>
		• strain of valve springs	F <sub>53</sub>
		• the valve balls deterioration	F <sub>54</sub>
		• wear of fastening and anchoring elements	F <sub>55</sub>
		• noises in pipes	F <sub>56</sub>
		• flaws or holes pipes	F <sub>57</sub>

	the operate circuit	• wear or unadjustment of fittings	F <sub>58</sub>
		• MCA unadjustment	F <sub>59</sub>
		• water losses	F <sub>60</sub>
		• the oil pressure absence	F <sub>61</sub>
	the manual pump	• wear of assembling and fastening elements (screws, pins)	F <sub>62</sub>
		• wear of sealing elements (seals)	F <sub>63</sub>
		• the inlet and outlet valve unadjustment	F <sub>64</sub>
PSS	the lubricate circuit	• noises and vibrations during functioning	F <sub>65</sub>
		• manual pump functioning parameters modification	F <sub>66</sub>
		• flaws or holes pipes	F <sub>67</sub>
		• oil losses	F <sub>68</sub>
	the signaling devise	• valves unadjustment	F <sub>69</sub>
		• wearing	F <sub>70</sub>
	the pin tearing	• unadjustment	F <sub>71</sub>
		• wearing	F <sub>72</sub>
	the differential manometer with electric contacts	• torn	F <sub>73</sub>
		• wearing	F <sub>74</sub>
	the level relay	• functioning parameters modification	F <sub>75</sub>
		• wearing	F <sub>76</sub>
	the end running limits	• functioning parameters modification	F <sub>77</sub>
		• wearing	F <sub>78</sub>
	• unadjustment r	F <sub>79</sub>	

In figure 1, it has been represented the events tree related to the undesirable event “catastrophic failure of BV operate subsystem”. In figure 2 it has been represented the events tree related to undesirable event “the failure of BV closing-sealing function, f<sub>2</sub>”.

The probability appearance of undesirable event “catastrophic failure of BV closing subsystem” is:

$$F_{OSS} = F_{NV} + F_S + F_{CVE} + F_{CV} + F_{OC} + F_{MP} \quad (1)$$

$$F_{NV} = \sum_{i=1}^5 F_{3i}; F_S = \sum_{i=6}^9 F_{3i} + \sum_{i=0}^1 F_{4i}; F_{CVE} = \sum_{i=2}^9 F_{4i}; F_{CV} = \sum_{i=5}^9 F_{6i}; \quad (2)$$

$$F_{OC} = \sum_{i=5}^9 F_{5i} + \sum_{i=0}^1 F_{6i}; F_{MP} = \sum_{i=2}^5 F_{6i}$$

F<sub>i</sub> – the probability appearance of F<sub>i</sub> fault; F<sub>ij</sub> - the probability appearance of F<sub>ij</sub> fault. Knowing the failure probability value (F<sub>OSS</sub>) it has been evaluated the others reliability indicators:

$$R_{OSS} = 1 - F_{OSS}; \beta_{OSS}(T_A) = F_{OSS} \times T_A \quad (3)$$

Base on the graph represented in figure 2 it has been wrote the relation of the probability of undesirable event appearance, “failure of BV closing-sealing function”:


$$P(\overline{f_2}) = \text{Prob}(\overline{\text{CSS}} \cup \overline{\text{SSS}}) = F_{\text{CSS}} + F_{\text{SSS}} = \sum_{i=1}^9 F_i + \sum_{i=0}^9 F_{1i} + \sum_{i=0}^3 F_{2i} \quad (4)$$

#### 4. Conclusions


As a result of analysis and studies achieved it obtained that the butterfly valve reliability it is important for the HPP reliability. The predictive reliability analysis it has been continued using the failure and events trees. Base on them it can evaluate, also the reliability indicators.

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**Fig. 1 The events tree related to the undesirable event „catastrophic failure of BV operate subsystem”**



**Fig.2 The events tree related to the undesirable event failure of BV  $f_2$  function**